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ABSTRACT 
 
On October 1st, 1946, the Nuremberg high command trails ended. The executions and 
life sentences of representatives of the German military and political elite were carried 
out by the Allied powers. At the time, the Soviet Union posed a greater threat than the 
Germans tried at Nuremberg. Years later, on October 9th, 1950, former officers of the 
German military gathered in Himmerod Abbey. Together they wrote the Himmerod 
Memorandum, which laid the foundation of the German rearmament and called for the 
release of German soldiers (Wehrmacht) and Schutzstaffel (SS) members convicted of 
war crimes. The Allies, desperate for another line of defense in Europe, agreed to release 
Wehrmacht war criminals and portray them as members of a “Clean” Wehrmacht in the 
hopes of building an experienced, legitimate army that could stand against potential 
Soviet invasion.  
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The “Clean Wehrmacht”:  
Myths about German War Crimes Then and Now 
 On November 20th, 1945, the Nuremberg Trails began in occupied Germany. For 
nearly a year, the International Military Tribunal (IMT) chronicled the crimes of the Nazi 
Party and their top collaborators. Over the course of the trials, German commanders and 
the general staff of the German Army, the Wehrmacht, routinely refused to acknowledge 
any wrong doings that occurred under their command. To admit to the crimes committed 
during the Second World War was an admission of guilt that would lead to execution. 
When evidence of illegal orders was presented by the international prosecution to the 
court, many Germans simply denied giving the order at all. One such example was the 
interview of General Heinz Guderian, in which he stated that he had received from 
Oberkommando Wehrmacht (OKW), otherwise known as army high command, the 
orders to carry out the elimination of resistance and prisoners of war captured on the 
Eastern Front. When pressed on what he did with these orders, Guderian responded that, 
“…I know the order never reached my troops.”1 With this statement, he suggests that 
upon receiving the orders he did not “pass on this order to [his] subordinates,” because of 
its criminal nature.2 Until their dying breath (1939-1995), most of the Nazi elite refused 
to acknowledge their part in the atrocities that occurred. In 1961, captured Nazi Adolf 
Eichmann summed up the mood of the German defense at Nuremberg during his own 
trial in Israel “…I would stress that I am guilty of having been obedient…”3 The 
 
1 Richard Overy, Interrogations: The Nazis Elite in Allied Hands, 1945 (Harmondsworth, England: Viking 
Penguin, 2001), 529. 
2 Overy, Interrogations, 530. 
3 Julie Dawson, “Guide to the Adolf Eichmann Trial Collection, 1938-1968,” Leo Baeck Institute, 
November 3, 2011, accessed April 23, 2019, http://digifindingaids.cjh.org/?pID=476341#a1. 
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testimonies of these men would later create one of the most pervasive myths to have 
surfaced since the war. The so-called “Clean” Wehrmacht Myth would plague German 
society for decades to come, feeding into the foundations of other myths, including 
Holocaust denial. 
 This thesis examine the ramifications of the Nuremberg Tribunal with the later 
creation of the myth of the “Clean” Wehrmacht by both post-war Germany and the newly 
hegemonic United States. Perpetuated after the Second World War ended, the “Clean” 
Wehrmacht Myth incorrectly inferred that the Wehrmacht had little to no part in the 
atrocities committed by the Nazi regime. The discussion on how to present the history of 
the German atrocities has spawned a long and contentious debate. Some have chosen to 
become deniers of German crimes, like French politician Paul Rassinier, whose work 
inspired decades of Holocaust denial.4 Another example is the German film industry, 
which produced pro-Wehrmacht films in the 1950s and early 1960s, blurring the memory 
of the common German.5 Events such as the Cold War also shaped the growth of the 
myth, allowing German commanders who had escaped imprisonment to release those 
already in prison for renewed service in in the new German army, the Bundeswehr, for 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Western Germany. The failure of 
the American Denazification program in West Germany left the new nation riddled with 
former Nazis and sympathizers who were never dealt with. The “Clean” Wehrmacht: 
Myths about German War Crimes Then and Now” attempts to examine the origins of the 
 
4 For an example of one of the earliest Holocaust deniers, see Paul Rassinier, Debunking the Genocide 
Myth: A Study of the Nazi Concentration Camps and the Alleged Extermination of European Jewry, ed. 
Adam Robbins (Newort Beach, CA: Noontide Press.) 92. 
5 08/15, directed by Paul May (Divinia-Film, 1954). 
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myth and how it changed over time among the NATO powers. By doing so, this project 
intends to illustrate how the narrative of Nazi military atrocities in German history have 
altered since the Second World War’s end. 
Primarily, this thesis will attempt to answer the following questions: How did the 
testimonies of German generals at Nuremberg and subsequent war trials help create the 
“Clean” Wehrmacht myth? What part did the memoirs of Germans play in creating the 
myth? By answering these questions, this project will provide a more concise history of 
post-war German society through a historiographical lens. Examining the foundations 
and results of the “Clean” Wehrmacht Myth sheds light on the less frequently discussed 
German cultural recovery during the Cold War and into the 21st century. This project 
offers a unique interpretation of the Nuremberg testimonies and how they shaped the 
reconstruction of West Germany including the creation of its own federal army. This 
project will answer these inquiries by utilizing published books, court transcripts and 
scholarly articles. 
 
Literature Review & Historical Context 
 Since the Second World War’s end, examinations of the war crimes of the 
German Army, known as the Wehrmacht, have been carefully scrutinized. During the 
1945-1946 Nuremberg Trails, the German military and political structure were held 
accountable for their crimes before the International Military Tribunal (IMT). At the end 
of the trails, two of the German high command, Wilhelm Keitel and Alfred Jodl, were 
executed by hanging while many other defendants served prison sentences. The end of 
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the IMT led to subsequent trails and proceedings, the longest of which lasted until 1981.6 
For much of the world, the memory of Germany’s war crimes was overshadowed by the 
Cold War between East and West. In the West, the former Allied nations formed the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to be a mutual defensive alliance against the 
Soviet Union. The Soviets responded with the Warsaw Pact, a conglomeration of puppet 
states and fellow Communist allies to stand against any NATO aggression. The need by 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact to quickly rebuild their respective sides of Europe shifted 
the focus of the Second World War’s aftermath from punishment to rearmament. Due to 
the lack of clarification on the definitions of the crimes committed in the language used 
during the Nuremberg Trials, the Wehrmacht was able to escape categorization  as a 
“criminal organization” unlike the SS (Schutzstaffel), SA (Sturmabteilung), the 
Wehrmacht High Command and the Gestapo were.7 By not definitively classifying the 
Wehrmacht as a criminal organization, Allied prosecutors set a dangerous precedent. 
German soldiers who were tried for war crimes would now not be labelled as criminals 
on par with the Nazi administration, allowing a perceived separation to form between the 
common Wehrmacht soldier, their SS counterparts, and members of the military high 
command. Nonetheless, militarization was stigmatized in postwar West Germany. In 
1950, former Wehrmacht generals Adolf Heusinger and Hans Speidel, along with other 
former senior officers, gathered in Himmerod Abbey, Germany. Together these former 
Wehrmacht officers drew up a forty-page document, known as the Himmerod 
Memorandum, calling for the release of German prisoners and for the image of the 
 
6 This is in reference to the Russian led Majdanek Trails. 
7Wolfram Wette, The Wehrmacht History Myth Reality, ed. Deborah Lucas Schneider (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2006), 209. 
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German soldier to be reformed in support of a new German military.8 The Allied Powers, 
who were now a part of NATO, agreed to honor the Memorandum in the hopes of 
building a German force capable of defending West Germany from possible Soviet 
aggression. The circumstances that built the foundation of the so called “Clean 
Wehrmacht Myth” were solidified with this agreement. 
The current historiography being addressed for this thesis is drawn from a number 
of sources ranging from 1955 to the present. This thesis will examine Nuremberg 
Military Tribunal testimonies, psychological reports of the Nuremberg defendants and 
peer-reviewed historical writings. The early portions of this thesis will focus on the 
Nuremberg testimonies and Military Governance documents created by the United States 
during the occupation of West Germany.  These works will be used to identify the state in 
which Germany found itself in at the end of the Second World War. This information is 
used to display the conditions in which the “Clean Wehrmacht” Myth was able to form. 
The next sections will focus on the formation of the Bundeswehr as West Germany’s new 
controversial army. This section showcase the earliest foundations of the “Clean 
Wehrmacht” in practice and will later be a central piece in the later discussed 
Historikreit, otherwise known as the (“Historians Dispute”) of the 1980s. 
The books and collections of US occupational documents that this thesis will be 
used alongside foundational secondary sources including Edward Peterson’s The 
American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory, Bryce Sait’s The Indoctrination of 
the Wehrmacht: Nazi Ideology and the War Crimes of the German Military, and Arieh 
 
8 David Large, Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era (Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1996) 97-100. 
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Kochavi’s Prelude to Nuremberg: Allied War Crimes Policy and the Question of 
Punishment, which offer valuable examination of United States military historical 
documents regarding the status of postwar Germany and the eventual collapse of the 
American Military Governance (AMG) Denazification Program.9 These books contain 
large collections of military documents regarding the occupation until its end in 1955. 
Consultation of the memoirs of Erich von Manstein, Albert Kesselring, Wilhelm Keitel 
and Albert Speer adds former Nazis’ attempt to rewrite their own history but will not be 
used as the main thrust of the argument. Instead this thesis focuses on the rebuilding of 
West Germany and its veterans’ associations who directly contributed to forming the 
Clean Wehrmacht Myth.10 The Nuremberg International Military Tribunal transcripts will 
be used to show the earliest foundations of the myth created by the defendants on trial. 
By examining West Germany’s postwar situation and the Nuremberg testimonies, this 
thesis evaluates how these works influenced early historical writings of the 
Denazification of Germany and the eventual Wehrmacht mythos.  
 Since the Himmerod Memorandum, perceptions of the German Wehrmacht had 
largely been separated from the Nazis. As the German economy and culture flourished 
 
9 Edward Peterson, The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory (Detroit, MI: Wayne State 
University Press, 1978,). 
Bryce Sait, Indoctrination of the Wehrmacht: Nazi Ideology and the War Crimes of the German Military 
(New York, NY: Berghahn Books, 2019,). 
Arieh Kochavi, Prelude to Nuremberg: Allied War Crime Policy and the Question of Punishment (Chapel 
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998). 
10 Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler’s Most Brilliant General, ed and trans. 
Anthony G. Powell (Chicago, IL: Zenith Press, 1955). 
Albert Kesselring, A Soldier’s Record, ed. and trans. S. L. A. Marshall (Westpoint, CT: Greenwood Press 
Publishers, 1970).  
Wilhelm Keitel, In Service of the Reich, ed. Walter Gorlitz, trans. David Irving (New York, NY: Stein and 
Day, 1966). 
Albert Speer, Infiltration, trans. Joachim Neugroschel (New York: NY: Macmillian Publishing CO. 1981). 
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after the war, films became a strong proponent of the Clean Wehrmacht myth.11 Films 
such as Der Arzt von Stalingrad and the 08/15 film trilogy give the impression that 
Wehrmacht soldiers were victims of the war.12 As historian Omar Bartov points out in his 
2004 essay, “Celluloid Soldiers”, the 1950 German war film culture heavily focused on 
portraying an image of innocent Wehrmacht soldiers acting heroically while the 
Wehrmacht’s cooperation with the SS and Einsatzgruppen (the death squad section of the 
SS) nor their own war crimes were shown.13 Revisionism of the Wehrmacht’s crimes also 
came from outside of Germany. French author, Buchenwald survivor, Holocaust denier, 
and politician Paul Rassinier wrote several books on the subject of the Holocaust, often 
calling into question the accounts of survivors. In his book, The Drama of European 
Jews, Rassinier goes as far as claiming that the Nazis never attempted to exterminate 
Europeans Jews.14 Rassinier’s works inspired other revisionists both in Europe and the 
Americas. Originating in the 1950s this wave of suppressing or more accurately ignoring 
the crimes of the Wehrmacht was at the forefront. Neither the German people nor the 
NATO nations were particularly concerned with remembering the crimes of the 
Wehrmacht and instead focused wholly on the Cold War.15 
  In the late 1980s a revision of World War II’s history was attempted by European 
and American scholars. During this period, an event known as the Historikerstreit, or 
“historians’ quarrel” began in 1986. The quarrel was a culmination of previous 
 
11Omar Bartov, Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University, 1992) 136. 
12 Der Arzt von Stalingrad, directed by Geza Radvanyi (Divinia-Film, 1958). 
13 08/15, directed by Paul May (Divinia-Film, 1954). 
14 Paul Rassinier, Debunking the Genocide Myth, 92. 
15 Brian Etheridge, Enemies to Allies: Cold War Germany and American Memory (Lexington KY: 
University Press of Kentucky, 2016) 114-115.  
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perspectives on exactly how historians should portray Nazi Germany in history. Before 
the Historikerstreit, there was no single prevailing view on how to explain the rise of 
Nazi Germany or the German people’s involvement with the Nazi regime. The historian 
and German veteran, Fritz Fischer in the mid-1960s supported the concept of a German 
“Sonderweg,” or special path, which stated that the Third Reich was a linear culmination 
of German history up to that point.16 By the 1970s a school of thought among historians 
called the Functionalists stated that German military commanders outside of the German 
high command (OKW or OKH) actively assisted in war crimes and the Holocaust, which 
at the time ran contrary to the memoirs and histories written by German commanders. 
Fischer’s Sonderweg theory fit with the Intentionalism theory which claimed that Hitler 
and the Nazi party envisaged the Holocaust during the 1930s and used the antisemitism 
of Germany to convince German people to help them. The opposing view of 
Functionalism determined that the Holocaust and genocide campaigns slowly  evolved as 
the Nazis gained power. By 1985, German history was being revisited by a greater 
number of authors within German society. One reason why the issue of German history 
was revisited was due to President Ronald Reagan’s comments during a ceremony in 
Bitburg, Germany. Within the cemetery several Wehrmacht and Waffen SS who had 
been buried there after the Second World War. Spurred on by Ronald Reagan’s claim that 
those buried in the cemetery were all victims of the Nazi Regime, the Historikerstreit 
began in earnest.17  
 
16John Moses and Fritz Fischer, The Encyclopedia of Historians and Historical Writing, edited by Kelly 
Boyd, Volume 1 (Chicago, IL: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 1999) 387. 
17 Richard Evans, In Hitler's Shadow (New York, NY: Pantheon, 1989) 16. 
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One of the early works of this period was History in a Land Without History, by 
Michael Stürmer, which argued heavily for another look at Germany’s past.18 Much of 
the controversy in this period occurred from the more conservative side of the German 
historical community, who often bemoaned the defeats or losses suffered by Germany 
during the war.19 Historian Ernst Nolte became one of the of primary figureheads of the 
conservative view in this controversy when he wrote and published The Past That Will 
Not Pass: A Speech That Could Be Written but Not Delivered in a Frankfurt newspaper.20 
Nolte’s work in the 1980s was similar to his view of fascism, which he stated in his 1963 
work, Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche, in which he claimed that the fascism of the 20th 
century arose from the German people’s transition into modernity.21 The opponents of 
these views were headed by scholars such as Richard J. Evans, who largely agreed with 
aspects of the arguments presented by Fischer and Nolte but, instead argued that National 
Socialism took root in the 19th century not just out as a result of modernity, but that the 
German middle class had already begun adopting the ideas of the eventual Nazis.22 Evans 
came to view German history from the view of the ordinary German, attempting to justify 
why the German people could become Nazis to begin with.23 
 The end of the dispute came in 1989, with Nolte and many of his fellow thinkers 
given credit for their research but ultimately, having their ideas of German history were 
 
18 James Knowlton and Truett Cartes, Forever in the Shadow of Hitler?, edited by Ernst Piper (Atlantic 
Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993) 16. 
19Donald McKale, Hitler's Shadow War (New York, NY: Cooper Square Press, 2002) 445. 
20 Ernst Nolte, The Past That Will Not Pass: A Speech That Could be Written but Not Delivered, ed. James 
Knowlton, Truett Cates (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 6, 1986) 18-23. 
21 Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism: Action Francaise, Italian Fascism, National Socialism 
(Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966) 621-625. 
22 Richard Evans, The Coming of the Third Reich (New York, NY: Penguin Group, 2003) 5. 
23 Nolte’s Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche, received a different name when transitioning to an English 
translation. 
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excluded from the historical narrative.. Bringing the conversation to a more general 
public in 1990s, the Wehrmachtsausstellung, a history exhibit detailing the crimes of the 
Wehrmacht’s average soldiers during the Second World War, began its tour around 
Germany.24 It ran in its original form from 1991-1995 and later revised for another 
exhibition run from 2001-2004. Since then the public perception of the German 
Wehrmacht’s history has been a much more mainstay part of public memory. Historians 
have been able to write history that tells more about what actually occurred during the 
war thanks to the writings made during the Historikerstreit. With widely covered cases 
such as Irving v. Penguin Books and Deborah Lipstadt coming to the forefront, the 
modern perspective on the activities of the Wehrmacht during the war have largely begun 
coinciding with history. The aftereffects of the Himmerod Memorandum and years of 
revisionism have faded away to modern times. 
  
Sources & Methodology 
Much of the early postwar perspective had a noticeable German bias regarding the 
actions of the Wehrmacht. This can be clearly seen from the given testimonies at the 
Nuremberg Trails (IMT) and the subsequent trails that lasted until 1981. The published 
memoirs and hours of interview and interrogation logs of German commanders 
encouraged the international community to see the Wehrmacht as entirely a military arm 
that was victimized by the German regime. The United States’ understanding of the war 
on the Eastern Front was shaped by the surviving German generals during the 1950s and 
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there was an effort by German films, the Himmerod Abbey Memorandum and the NATO 
powers to reinvent the German army into something presentable. This ultimately resulted 
in the creation of the German Bundeswehr, or Federal Army of Germany, whose early 
founders consisted of former Wehrmacht soldiers. With the end of the Allied military 
occupation in 1955, West Germany passed a compulsory military conscription law the 
very next year to help bolster its forces to defend against possible invasion.25 By the late 
1980s, the perception of German crimes had begun to change with special attention being 
attributed to the Wehrmacht’s crimes. Historians such as Jünger Förster, Richard J. 
Evans, Ian Kershaw and Martin Broszat helped begin a debate within Western Germany 
as to how the history of the Wehrmacht and Nazis Germany should be viewed.26 
Throughout the 1990s many historians, a notable one being Omer Bartov, continued to 
poke holes in the “Good Wehrmacht” myth. In Germany this became evident as well as 
museum exhibits began showing depictions of Wehrmacht crimes and retelling the 
history behind such actions. This issue also received world-wide attention during the case 
of Irving v. Penguin Books and Deborah Lipstadt in the United Kingdom, which ended in 
another vindication of the truthfulness to the crimes against humanity that the Nazis and 
Wehrmacht partook in. 
As detailed in the literature review, this project utilizes the Nuremberg Trial 
transcripts and psychology reports of the defendants and prosecutors during the trial’s 
 
25 Jenny Gesley, “60 Year anniversary of the German Compulsory Military Service Act,” Library of 
Congress, July 21, 2016, accessed April 6, 2020, https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2016/07/60-year-anniversary-of-
the-german-compulsory-military-service-act/. 
26 It should be noted that Historians of this era had many differing views on the Wehrmacht, Nazis and the 
Holocaust. Martin Broszat for example held the Functionalist view of the Holocaust, arguing that it was the 
competing views or internal pressure of the Nazis administration that resulted in Holocaust. It should also 
be noted that Martin Broszat had been a member of the Nazis Party since 1944.  
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proceedings. Examples come from Alfred Jodl, Wilhelm Keitel and Albert Kesselring, all 
three of whom were generals in the German Wehrmacht. Russian prosecution will be left 
out of this project due to this project’s stated goal of identifying NATO power 
perceptions. The organization and documents related to the rebuilding of Germany by the 
Western powers will also be examined for the NATO denazification program and its 
failings under Lucius Clay and other military governors in Germany. Later analysis will 
follow the NATO speeches made in the 1950s on the German Wehrmacht, particularly 
from political leaders such as Konrad Adenauer, who spoke on the subject while serving 
as chancellor of West Germany. Subsequent works will be drawn primarily from the 
1980s and 1990s from historians involved in the Historikerstreit.  
 This thesis claims that the evolution of the “Clean” Wehrmacht myth is heavily 
tied to the testimonies of the Nuremberg Trails, the postwar occupation and histories 
written by NATO and the surviving German generals, and the growing fear of 
Communism present during the 1950s. This early history formed a strong foundation that 
created strong misconceptions that were not fully resolved until the late 1980s. Because 
the myth was able to persist for so long, the retelling of the period for historical purposes 
is harmed by opponents purporting the myth of the “Clean” Wehrmacht. This thesis 
illustrates a clear timeline of events and ideas that can be traced back to a clear and 
defined origin. Because the scope of this thesis is limited to the myth and what directly 
influenced it, the propensity of information regarding the turmoil of 1960s and 1970s in 
Germany will be slim. Information regarding the Cold War will also be present but 
limited. The use of German generals’ memoirs is limited with a greater emphasis being 
placed upon Nuremberg testimonies and the myth’s part in the early years of West 
14 
 
Germany. Through the completion of this project, the myth of a “Clean” Wehrmacht and 
its ramifications will be closely documented and explained in detail with regard to how it 
affected Germany and the history of the Second World War. 
  
15 
 
 
Chapter I: Nuremberg and the High Command Trials 
 With the fighting against the Nazi regime nearly over, the Allied powers gathered 
together in Potsdam, Germany to discuss how to handle a post Second World War 
Europe. The dismantling of the Nazi party and its collaborators became a massive 
concern for the victorious powers. The United Nations War Crimes Commission 
(UNWCC) formed to organize the upcoming trails and identify individuals to be placed 
on trial. The US State Department and the British Foreign Service created the UNWCC 
with the intention of investigating and recording war crimes committed by the Axis 
powers.27 The men put in charge of the commission, particularly Cecil Hurst and Herbert 
Pell, had different visions for the operation of the UNWCC. Cecil Hurst, a British 
international lawyer who served on the Court of International Justice, imagined an 
organizational body whose purpose is to charge and try war criminals before and 
international court of various representative nations. Herbert Pell, a United States 
Ambassador and American counterpart to Cecil Hurst, saw the UNWCC as another 
method of preventing a third world war by restraining Germany. In Pell’s opinion, 
Germany had to be punished so brutally that future Germans would see war as, “[not] a 
profitable business.”28 At the time of the commission’s formation in 1943, a precise 
definition of war crimes that was accepted by all nations had not been drafted. The lack 
of a singular, regulated definition would prove troublesome for the UNWCC’s original 
mission. Other councils at the end of past wars had created their own definitions for war 
 
27 Arieh Kochavi, Prelude to Nuremberg, 92. 
28 Arieh Kochavi, Prelude to Nuremberg, 93. 
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crimes; one such council, held at the end of the First World War, had drawn up a number 
of conclusive war crimes. The 1919 Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of 
the War on the Enforcement of Penalties was used by the UNWCC as a reference point 
for identifying the crimes committed in the Second World War. After months of 
deliberation on which crimes could be considered war crimes, the UNWCC had decided 
that strictly defining war crimes in the context of the Second World War would be too 
limiting and would risk excluding other potential crimes yet to be committed.29 
 As the UNWCC’s deliberation stretched into 1944, the nature of the criminality of 
Germany’s war against the Allies was debated. Specifically, it was to be decided if, 
“Aggressive war,” prosecutable as an official war crime. The issue of how to define the 
war from a legal standpoint was passed on to a legal advisory committee that presented 
its interpretation of international law to the UNWCC. Within the legal committee, debate 
arose. The majority of the committee argued that under international law, the act of 
aggressive war did not represent a crime for which heads of state could be held criminally 
responsible before a court. The majority opinion cited the Kellog-Briand Pact which 
renounced war as a tool of international diplomacy but did not officially criminalize the 
matter.30 The minority view stated that by declaring a war to “enslave foreign nations, to 
destroy the civilization of those nations and physically to annihilate…the population on a 
racial, political or religious ground,” Germany and its armies had committed innumerable 
war crimes against the nations of the world and should be held criminally responsible.31 
The so-called, “Aggressive War,” Germany was waging was to be defined as a war crime 
 
29 Arieh Kochavi, Prelude to Nuremberg, 97. 
30 Arieh Kochavi, Prelude to Nuremberg, 96-98. 
31 Arieh Kochavi, Prelude to Nuremberg, 97. 
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itself. Cecil Hurst interjected himself into this argument, presenting a compromise that 
Germany’s actions in the Second World War should be made an exception and declared a 
war crime. Hurst determined that since the Allies could not come to a singular definition, 
the UNWCC should still charge Germany with war crimes to prevent the Allies from 
appearing weak in punishing the Nazis. This compromise was agreed to by the UNWCC, 
but the British Foreign Service and United States State Department refused to vote in 
favor of such a compromise. The debate would not be settled until the London conference 
in 1945 after the war had officially ended. In the charter for the International Military 
Tribunal (IMT), aggressive war was to be considered a criminal offense in which an 
individual or organization may be charged in part or in whole.32  
 The second largest role taken on by the UNWCC was the identification and 
charging of war criminals throughout the German military and administration. Early on in 
1943, the known names and responsibilities of German officials was dubious at best. The 
German High Command was largely known, but information regarding those who carried 
out orders and to what extent was limited. The Allies had a serious lack of presence in 
mainland Europe and the shortage of POWs and liberated populations meant the 
knowledge of perpetrators among individual military units was sparse. The extermination 
of witnesses and the destruction of evidence by the SS, Gestapo and Wehrmacht in their 
operations made evidence collection for the UNWCC incredibly difficult. To address this 
problem, the UNWCC decided to arrest any member or former member of the SS or 
Gestapo that they could get their hands on. This decision was also extended to 
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Wehrmacht generals and important members of the civil administration. The UNWCC 
hoped that these individuals could be detained long enough for evidence to be collected 
and to prevent any criminals from escaping. The UNWCC had determined that no 
immunity should be given to any member of the Nazi government; all would be 
investigated and if need be, brought to trial. In their first compiled lists of war criminals 
the UNWCC presented 712 names of Germans and Italians who had committed 
international crimes. Among those names were diplomats, regional administrators, 
political personalities and 17 Wehrmacht generals.33 
 In February of 1938, Adolf Hitler had abolished Germany’s War Department and 
took command of the Wehrmacht as the Minister of War. After this, Hitler created the 
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), which advised Hitler on directing the armed 
forces.34 The German High Command offered direct support to Hitler and ran the war 
effort as it broke international treaties in pursuing an aggressive war. It was imperative 
that Hitler and the Nazis gained the support of the military general staff because their war 
experience of invaluable for the wars Hitler intended to wage. The generals allied 
themselves with the Nazism’s goals by seeking to expand German territory and undo the 
punishments made by the Versailles Treaty. Fearing that the Nazis would build their own 
army, the generals of the old Reichswehr willing cooperated with the Nazi party and 
agreed to aid them in their ambitions. The willingness of the German generals to involve 
themselves in the aims of the Nazis put them firmly in the same lot as the Nazis by the 
wars end. The OKW was directly response for the carrying out of the Nazi agenda on the 
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warfront, conquering new territory illegally from the other nations of Europe and killing 
its people.35 
 The German OKW’s highest members were charged by the UNWCC for war 
crimes. The UNWCC’s High Command trial had chosen to charge only, “The 
group…[of] first, German officers who held the top positions in the four supreme 
commands…and second, the officers who held the top field commands.”36 The 
indictments laid against these members were, “Crimes against Peace, War Crimes and 
Crimes against Humanity, and Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit those Crimes,” as 
defined by the tribunal’s own charter for the trial.37 A large part of the reasoning for the 
charges levelled against the German military command was the justification that, 
“Aggressive war cannot be prepared and waged without intense activity on the part of all 
branches of the Armed Forces…”38 The German High Command wholly committed 
themselves to the act of aggressive war and could be proven by the actions laid out before 
the beginning of the war. The UNWCC listed the evidence of the secret rearmament 
made after the First World War, the creation of a formal military air force, the 
conscription law made in 1935 and the reoccupation of the Rhineland. The UNWCC 
prosecutors argued that the preparation for rebuilding the German military was intended 
to be used in wars against Germany’s European neighbors. General Alfred Jodl, a 
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member of the accused had been quoted in a 1943 speech stating, “…the part…played by 
the National Socialist movement in re-awakening the will to fight in nurturing fighting 
strength and in rearming the German people…has so happily been successful.”39 The 
German generals were being given another chance after the punishing Versailles Treaty 
to fight again. German aggression is evidenced further by the acquisition of Austria, the 
invasion of Czechoslovakia, the invasion of Poland, Belgium, Netherlands and France 
and the invasion of the Soviet Union. The defense council for the High Command 
attempted to counter the charges presented by the Tribunal’s indictment by stating that 
the charges had not been preestablished international law prior to the war. The banning of 
aggressive war had not been agreed upon after the First World War nor had the legal 
international definition of War Crimes been internationally accepted by the nations of the 
world, including Germany. The UNWCC had already grappled with such qualms in 1943 
when the planning of the Tribunal began. In a simple move, the Tribunal stated that such 
an objection was impossible thanks to Article 3 of the Nuremberg International Military 
Tribunal’s (IMT) charter which indicated that, “Neither the Tribunal, its members nor 
their alternates can be challenged by the prosecution, or by the Defendants or their 
Counsel.”40 The trial of the German High Command would continue unimpeded. 
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The Defense Argument at Nuremberg 
In their defense against the charges, German commanders denied their guilt by 
laying the blame squarely on Hitler and the SS. Herman Goering, commander in chief of 
the Luftwaffe (German Airforce) and Hitler’s chosen successor, stated during his trials at 
Nuremberg “Why isn’t Hitler here to answer for these things?”41 Wilhelm Keitel, chief of 
Wehrmacht High Command (OKW), shared a similar sentiment towards Hitler’s suicide 
in his own memoir, stating “Hitler himself chose death rather than accept responsibility 
for the actions of the OKW, of Colonel-General Jodl and myself.”42 The Wehrmacht 
officers and Nazi party officials on trial saw fit to shift the Second World War’s blame 
almost entirely onto Adolf Hitler in an attempt to clear themselves of wrong-doing.43 
Some even chose to place a large portion of blame onto the SS. Describing the SS as a 
“…state within a state,” the commanders attributed the SS’s power in support of Hitler 
and Himmler as being at odds with the General Staff.44 Keitel and his fellow Nazi Hans 
Frank, the Governor-General of Poland and legal advisor to Hitler and the Nazis during 
the 1930s, made even bolder claims as the trials wore on. While at Nuremberg they 
asserted in an interview with their court psychiatrist that “…we really didn’t believe 
Hitler meant war.”  When questioned a few days later on why he did not understand the 
invasion of Poland in 1939, would lead to a war with France and Britain, Keitel 
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responded that Hitler had never told them of the Allied protection of Poland and was 
surprised they chose to go to war. When Joachim von Ribbentrop, foreign minister for the 
Third Reich, overheard this, he is reported to have responded “Well it was announced on 
September 1st. Maybe you didn’t see it.”45  
The claims made by the German High Command were false. The OKW and 
important members of the Nazi government had been aware of Hitler’s intention to start a 
war since the repeal of the Reich’s Defense Law in May of 1935. Again in 1937, a 
meeting occurred between Hitler, Admiral Erich Raeder, Constantin von Neurath and 
Herman Goering regarding plans to invade and occupy Austria and Czechoslovakia, 
which might likely lead to war with Great Britain and France. The plan stated, “German 
politics must reckon with its two hateful enemies, England and France to whom a strong 
German colossus in the center of Europe would be intolerable.”46 The Nazi High 
Command understood even in 1937, that Germany’s territorial expansions would bring 
France and England into conflict with the Third Reich. After the success in 
Czechoslovakia a plan known as Case Green was drawn up by Hitler, Goering, Raeder, 
Keitel and Colonel-General Walther von Brauchitsch, among several other officers in 
OKW. Created in April of 1938, Case Green had several portions dedicated to France and 
England entering a potential war against Germany. One passage dealing specifically with 
the English threat read “England sees in our development the foundation of a hegemony 
which would weaken England. England is therefore our enemy, and the conflict with 
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England will be a life-and-death struggle.”47 It was inevitable in the German military 
mindset that war with England would occur so long as Germany continued to make 
territorial gains.  
To dismiss the prospect of war with the powers of Europe as entirely Hitler’s idea 
is simply false. Undeniably the defendants at Nuremberg chose to deliberately obscure 
the truth about their actions during the war and blame Hitler and other prominent Nazis. 
Jodl himself commented on the testimonies of the Wehrmacht generals stating “…those 
generals are just talking now to preserve their own existence.”48 The OKW repeatedly 
placed the blame on other figures and organizations just as the rest of the general staff 
did. Admiral Doenitz argued in a personal statement with his court psychiatrist that 
defected soldiers and commanders were “…preaching out-and-out treason,” while in 
Soviet hands. Doenitz argued that this propaganda had resulted in, “…the [loss of] lives 
of thousands of German women and children by causing defection in the ranks.”49 The 
Germans placed on trial would do anything to shift the blame of the war, those who lost 
their lives and the destruction of Germany and Europe onto anyone else they could. 
When Field Marshal Friedrich von Paulus was brought to testify regarding the invasion 
of Russia he told the court that the German OKW had been beginning to prepare for an 
illegal war with the Soviet Union as early as September 1940. Paulus specifically 
indicated that Keitel, Jodl and Goering all had substantial parts in planning this such a 
war. The testimony resulted in uproar from the OKW’s defendants. They angerly 
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dismissed Paulus’s claims, simply calling him a dirty pig and a traitor. Goering himself 
even stating to his attorney that “We’ve got to disgrace that traitor!”50 The high 
command’s refusal to take any sort of responsibility for the Second World War and their 
insistence on blaming Hitler everything created a strong foundation for the Clean 
Wehrmacht Myth. OKW’s attempt to dodge all blame for the war painted the picture that 
the Wehrmacht were not responsible for Germany’s crimes but were victims as well.  
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Chapter II: The Clean Wehrmacht Myth’s Origins in the Second 
World War and State of Post-War Germany 
To understand the formation of the “Clean” Wehrmacht myth, it is prudent to go 
back to the Second World War and clearly identify that the Wehrmacht indeed had an 
active part in war crime activities beyond engaging in an illegal war. Nominally, the need 
to clearly identify that the Wehrmacht indeed had an active part in war crime activities 
beyond engaging in an illegal war. The German military before the Second World War 
had already been trained as a political military force for decades. The German officer 
schools of the past acted much like a university as well as a military training institution to 
ensure its officer corps fell in line politically with current administrations.51 German 
officers up to and during the Second World War were expected to be politically well 
versed. When the Nazi party came into power in 1933, the training and teachings given to 
the army’s officer corps also shifted to match the ideals of the Nazi party. Particularly 
during the administration of General Werner von Blomberg, the Nazification of the 
Wehrmacht was expected. Under Blomberg’s supervision, officers were educated on 
“political questions,” along with guidelines regarding the Nazi ideology.52 The 
indoctrination of Wehrmacht officers contributed to their willingness to carry out 
questionable orders. The most prominent example of the criminal orders issued is the 
Wehrmacht Kommissarbefehl, or Commissar Order, which was given sixteen days prior 
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to Operation Barbarossa, the June 22 invasion of the Soviet Union.53 This order directed 
that soldiers were to eliminate political commissars, prisoners of war and supposed 
partisans who might offer resistance to the Wehrmacht. The order also covered were 
individuals in the front and rear areas who were, “…suspected of resistance, sabotage or 
instigation thereto.”54 In regards to Commissars captured behind the frontlines the order 
mandated that these individuals be handed over specifically to the Einsatzgruppen 
(mobile killing units) and SS. Officers in the Wehrmacht followed these orders 
impeccably, at times even going further than necessary because of the ideological 
training they received while in officer school. German soldiers involved in Operation 
Barbarossa were willing participants in a clear war of extermination against Bolshevism 
and the Slavic peoples. Crimes against Soviet troops, supposed Partisans and civilians 
was rampant throughout the campaigns in Soviet territory with no signs of abating.55 
Soldiers and officers of the Wehrmacht were not only indoctrinated into the Nazi’s 
ideology, they willingly embraced such ideals and methods as evidenced by soldiers on 
mass carrying out such orders since the 1941 invasion until the end of the war. 
In the postwar reconstruction of Germany, the Allied Powers divided up Germany 
into four zones of control. Each zone’s occupiers agreed to carry out a policy of 
rebuilding and Denazification in order to quickly reform Germany and destroy Nazism at 
the same time. The Western Powers goal for Denazification was to remove any individual 
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with party membership in the NSDAP from political or bureaucratic positions. Initially, 
the military governance attempted to identify and remove Nazis party members through 
questioning and surveys.56 As this program continued a unique paradox presented itself to 
the occupation forces. Much like the military, the Nazi Government had organized their 
political system in such a way that in order to gain certain positions, one would have to 
become a party member. This policy resulted in numerous citizens becoming Nazis 
without believing in the Nazi cause or ideology. Thus, government officials, 
schoolteachers, secretaries, bureaucrats, etc. competent or otherwise were all card-
carrying Nazis. Yet, interviewers and surveyors of German society even as early as 1944 
quickly identified that much of the German population was anti-Nazi. The youth of 
Germany did not support Nazism either. This was especially true among Catholic 
families due to Nazism’s disgust with religions being reciprocated by Catholics. Among 
the working class and skilled workers, the number of categorical “true Nazis,” was 
incredibly small, often in the single digits percentage wise. Among managers and 
executives, the percentage was estimated at 14%, leaving the vast majority non-Nazi.57 
Among the non-military population, Nazism was far less popular by the end of the war, 
resulting in the people either abandoning Nazi ideals or cementing anti-Nazi sentiment. 
However, the Nazi administration’s liberal issuing of party membership resulted in a 
complication for the Occupation Powers.  
The Occupation governments now had to identify who joined the party and then 
whether or not they believed in the Nazi ideology. To combat this, the Occupational 
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Powers compiled an arrest category list. Individuals who fell under certain categories 
were arrested and placed into temporary internment camps until their innocence could be 
verified. Classified as Law No. 8 by the US occupation the law stated that, “It shall be 
unlawful for any business enterprise to employ any member of the Nazi Party or its 
affiliate organizations in positions other than ordinary labor.” Implemented in September 
1945, Law No. 8 proved too difficult to manage due to number of individuals that 
qualified for arrest. By the end of 1945, 30,00 more Germans had been arrested and 
placed into internment camps.58 This, coupled with the already arrested 70,000 since the 
War’s end resulted in an incredible backlog of appeals for detainees. As time went on 
individuals processed and tried under this law were given less and less punishing because 
of the burden of so many detainees. In an effort to placate growing complaints from local 
Germans, the US military governance chose to have German manned court take over 
some of the more important cases. Of the 575 court cases for categorized “major 
offenders,” given to the German courts, they listed 355 as followers of the Nazi regime 
rather than high ranking perpetrators. They further exonerated 49 additional major 
offenders.59 When this was noticed, it was perceived by the US military governance that 
the German courts were sabotaging the process of denazification. The German people 
were growing tired of the large numbers being tried in all occupational zones. Tens of 
thousands of citizens, Nazi or otherwise were being pulled from the workforce needed to 
rebuild Germany and instead shifted to internment camps to await trail. Amongst the 
populace Germans in the new government insisted that enforcing Law No. 8 was political 
suicide while officials of the US military governance found the policy too logistically 
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demanding, an, “administrative impossibility.”60 The process of denazification was 
difficult in concept and a near impossibility in practice. Identifying true Nazis amongst 
the populace was proving to be difficult to accomplish for the US Occupation. The new 
government of West Germany had to keep up with Nazi party members and then had to 
rebuild the government with said party members because those were the only Germans 
competent for the job at the time. Germans of any merit or in government positions 
running the nation were required to be party members during the Nazi regime. Because of 
the difficulty in identifying every “true Nazi,” in power, many with Nazi sympathizers 
slipped through the cracks and gained positions of power.  
In some cases, self-proclaimed Nazis were hired on by the United States for 
service in various industries or scientific fields. Operation Paperclip was a US program to 
acquire high-value Nazis to be used within the US.61In order to gain an edge during the 
Cold War, the US acquired as many Nazi scientists as they could, regardless of their 
association with Hitler or the Nazi party. Along with this the CIA implemented Operation 
Gladio, a covert “stay-behind,” paramilitary movement organized in the nations of 
Western Europe. The goal of this program was for paramilitary resistance groups to 
perform sabotage operations behind enemy lines in the event of a Soviet invasion of 
Europe. These groups were to mimic the successes of the French and Polish resistances 
that had risen against the Nazis.62 Among these groups was the Schnez-Truppe, the 
 
60 Edward Peterson, The American Occupation of Germany, 151. 
61 Allison Eldridge-Nelson, “Veil of Protection: Operation Paperclip and the Contrasting Fates of Wernher 
Von Braun and Arthur Rudolph,” (master’s thesis, Bowling Green State University, 2017), accessed 
February 8, 2020, 
https://etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send_file?accession=bgsu1510914308951993&disposition=inline. 
62 Umberto Bilisco, interview by Mary Beth Sheridan, “Former ‘Gladiators’ Tell of Secrecy, U.S. 
Contacts,” AP News, November 20, 1990, accessed December 18, 2019, 
https://apnews.com/95a9d9c5b49ced1a29cad465bef852df. 
30 
 
German branch of Gladio’s paramilitaries. This organization formed in 1949, by Albert 
Schnez and other former Wehrmacht and Waffen SS veterans from the war. Basing 
themselves in the US Occupation zone, this group would combat Soviet forces until 
NATO could intervene. Germany, after the war, had no formal military until the 
formation of the Bundeswehr in the 1950s so the Schnez-Truppe would be the next line 
of defense after NATO forces withdrew. At the end of the 1940s the German government 
was reorganized but still influenced by former Nazis or Nazi sympathizers in power due 
to the difficulty in identifying and removing them all. The US recruited Nazi scientists 
for Operation Paperclip and tens of thousands of potential laborers were placed into 
internment camps. If the United States believed using German scientists, many of whom 
were former Nazis, as a viable option for gaining an advantage in the Cold War, it should 
come as no surprise that former Nazis were also deemed as acceptable components of a 
force designed to repel an invasion of West German territory. The nation’s only capable 
fighting force outside of NATO was comprised of former SS and Wehrmacht forces.  
Removing Nazis from Germany proved too complex for the reconstruction 
government to fully accomplish. The left-over Nazis which were missed by Allied 
occupation programs or hired by the Allies themselves remained in Germany long after 
the war had ended. The formation of the formal German army in 1955, known as the 
Bundeswehr, would be formed from the Schnez-Truppe and a provisional border force 
comprised of former SS and Wehrmacht troops. The commanders of this new army were 
generals from the former Nazi Reich. Men like general Hans Speidel, Erwin Rommel’s 
former military aid during the Second World War, and lieutenant general Adolf 
Heusinger. Both had served the Nazi regime in the Wehrmacht’s general staff. Heusinger 
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would go on to become the Chairman of the NATO military Committee from 1961-
1964.63 The exoneration and employment of these generals perpetuated the Clean 
Wehrmacht Myth. The Allied powers encouraged the reformation of the German armed 
forces and made no protest when it was staffed by former Wehrmacht and SS soldiers. 
These former Nazis would continue to shape the new Germany whose image and purpose 
was remade to stand against Communism and the Soviet menace.64 
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Chapter III: After Nuremberg: Postwar Concessions 
 After the Nuremberg Trials, the Nazi high command was fully dissolved. Most of 
the administration and military staff that made up the party’s core elite were condemned 
to various prison sentences or execution. Among the Nazi officials prosecuted in later 
trails, those in association with the SS or with the Holocaust received life imprisonment 
or the death penalty. Those involved with places like Auschwitz, Dachau and other 
concentration camps received the most death sentences. Nearly every defendant standing 
trail for involvement with the camps were executed for their involvement.65 The same 
occurred in International Military Tribunal for the Far East, were 7 of 28 defendants got 
the death penalty and 16 received life imprisonments. This represents 82% of the charged 
military officials for the Far East trials.66 In stark contrast most generals of Wehrmacht 
operations typically received only prison sentences and not death penalties. Of the 14 
charged generals in the High Command Trial, started in late 1947, only two received life 
imprisonments, the rest received sentences of no less than 5 years, excluding those 
acquitted.67 The Wehrmacht high command officers were charged with nearly equivalent 
crimes as were their Japanese counterparts, yet the Wehrmacht officers comparatively 
received much lighter sentences. Those charged in the High Command Trial were 
members of the German Wehrmacht Oberkommando (OKB), the operational 
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headquarters who had direct contact with Hitler during the war. The commanders below 
these individuals were not placed on trial by the Nuremberg courts on the same scale as 
OKB, leaving them free to return home. Though a vast number of war crimes were 
committed by the Wehrmacht during the war, the majority of the trials focused on 
prosecuting the Nazi Party administration. Close to two hundred SS and Concentration 
Camp members had been charged for their actions in the field or in participation to the 
Holocaust, most being sentenced to life imprisonment or to death. In comparison, the 
Wehrmacht high command were given prison sentences, the least of which being 5 
years.68 An attempt at organizing additional trials for some of the other commanders 
would occur in 1948 and 1949 involving Gerd von Rundstedt, Erich von Manstein, 
Walther von Brauchitsch and Rudolf Strauss. These trials were planned to be run by the 
British courts and hoped to prosecute these four generals, however before the trials could 
commence, Brauchitsch dies of heart failure and Rundstedt and Strauss are deemed too 
unhealthy to stand trial. As a result, only Manstein was brought to trial and given a 
seventeen-year sentence which was later reduced to twelve years in 1950 due to outside 
pressures from the British and German public. Three years later von Manstein was 
released from prison for eye problems after only serving four years of his original 
seventeen-year sentence. 
 Being pardoned or freed from their sentences the German military commanders 
found themselves in a completely new Germany. The reconstruction of West Germany 
was geared towards stabilizing and rebuilding the country it to stand against possible 
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intrusion from the Soviet Bloc. In this new Germany the status and societal privilege of 
being a German officer had been lost.  Further insult towards veterans of the Wehrmacht 
occurred when the repeated petitions for military pensions to be paid was rejected by the 
occupied government.69 Former officers fell upon hard times in the new, weak civilian 
markets. Wehrmacht officers exited service with little transferable skills with older 
officers having it far worse. The lack of skills and inability to acquire civilian 
employment resulted in many of these formerly important officers becoming 
unemployed. Many Wehrmacht officers filed complaints with the Allied administration, 
citing the horrible conditions they now endured, and bemoaned the lack of pensions. 
Among the most famous complaints came from General Wilhelm von Leeb, who wrote 
his own letter to the occupation government, arguing that by denying pensions to 
servicemen the Allies were “legally as well as morally and humanly,” unjust.70 The 
injustice of being reduced to a mere civilian and being shamed for the Second World War 
had angered the surviving officer corps. 
 Rebuilding the West German bureaucracy to resemble that of the Weimar 
Republic’s, the new Federal Republic began its bureaucratic reforms in the fall of 1949.71 
With the new bureaucracy being shaped and the West German government taking over 
much of the operation of the nation, German veterans made another plea to the Federal 
Republic’s finance ministers for the restoration of pensions. Arguments between former 
Wehrmacht and the new government would last for months as both sides attempted to 
arrive at a favorable agreement. In the fall of 1950, Konrad Adenauer, first Chancellor of 
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West Germany, addressed the issue along with the planned rearmament of West 
Germany. In his speech, Adenauer agreed with Wehrmacht veterans stating that their 
treatment after the war was “completely unjust…” and that these men had been made 
“collectively responsible for the lost war…” He argued that “The time of collective guilt 
of the militarists…must be ended once and for all.”72 Adenauer’s 1950 speech furthered 
the image of a Wehrmacht who was victimized by the Nazi government. In subsequent 
laws and policies considered by the West German government, the veterans of the 
Wehrmacht began receiving pensions for their service in the Second World War and from 
the Interwar years, further legitimizing the perception of the Clean Wehrmacht. 
 The success of the Wehrmacht veterans in acquiring their pensions emboldened 
them and fostered a wave of veteran legislation.73 Large numbers of veteran advocacy 
groups began to spring up in the new Republic all falling under the branch of “citizens’ 
associations,” under official documentation. These organizations attempted to represent 
veterans similarly to organizations made before the Second World War. With the 
outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and China’s later intervention that same year, 
Adenauer and these new veterans’ associations used the war in Asia as a way of 
readdressing West German rearmament. The veterans’ associations made an appeal to 
Chancellor Adenauer agreeing to aid with rearmament in exchange for a redressing of the 
Wehrmacht’s image. In a letter to Adenauer the veterans’ groups argued that the 
formation of a new army rested on “the ending of the German soldier’s defamation 
[which] is the prerequisite for the revival of a solid army...”74 The final request made by 
 
72 James Diehl, The Thanks of the Fatherland, 157-159. 
73 James Diehl, The Thanks of the Fatherland, 163. 
74 James Diehl, The Thanks of the Fatherland, 180. 
36 
 
the veterans’ associations was that soldiers imprisoned for war crimes to be released. The 
government agreed to the terms, forming a singular veterans organization for the country 
known as the Verband Deutscher Soldaten, “Association of German Soldiers.” The other 
demands made by the veterans would be honored after the writing of the Himmerod 
Memorandum. West Germany formed their own official army in 1955. Known as the 
Bundeswehr and made up of many former Wehrmacht and Waffen SS freed from prisons 
across Europe. The veterans of the Second World War would continue to serve as a 
defensive force against potential Soviet invasion. Officers for the Bundeswehr were 
drawn from the former general staff and many had their sentences lightened or forgiven. 
In 1955, West Germany was admitted to NATO and its forces were rearmed for the 
defense of Western Europe.75 
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Chapter IV: Conclusion 
The Wehrmacht officers who fought in the Second World War had sought to 
exonerate themselves from the reputation of the Nazi Regime after the war. The general 
corps of the Wehrmacht especially sought to free themselves of the Reich’s reputation. 
The officers had viewed much of the war to be Hitler’s fault and were furious that their 
legacies were dragged down with his. During the Nuremberg trials, prominent officers 
were quoted blaming Hitler. Many other Nazi elites in their later memoirs and post war 
writings also shifted the blame onto Hitler or those who were executed following postwar 
war crimes trails. The Allied powers took this opportunity to acquired statements from 
the former commanders of the Wehrmacht regarding the conflict on the Eastern front 
from their perspective. The amount of information the Allies gleamed from the Soviet 
perspective was slim and the Allied command sought to obtain a clearer picture of the 
war in the East. Beyond this many German commanders felt their own need to create 
their accounts of the war. General Erich von Manstein, being among the most famous 
examples, wrote scathing assessments on Hitler’s leadership. Von Manstein blamed 
Hitler’s belief of the “power of will,” which von Manstein attributed to much of how 
Hitler operated Germany strategically or otherwise.76 At Nuremberg, the officers on trial 
and those called as witnesses placed blame onto Hitler, Himmler and the Nazi party. 
Attempting to ignore or lie about the plans for aggressive war and the war crimes 
committed during the war, the German officers refused to accept responsibility for the 
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role they played in the war. The postwar occupation and reconstruction of Germany by 
the Allied powers saw a period of demilitarization and denazification that ultimately 
failed by the conclusion of the occupation. The task of denazifying Germany proved to be 
too much effort for the resource scare occupational governments leaving the job half 
finished. West Germany’s new government in 1949, ignored external Allied pleas for 
continuation of their occupational programs and pressed on with rebuilding their nation 
as quickly as possible. In this period the veterans and officers of the Wehrmacht made 
their return and tried to reestablish themselves within the postwar government. Realizing 
that the advantages of having the Wehrmacht veterans on his side, Konrad Adenauer 
agreed to allow Wehrmacht veterans to reform their history in an effort to secure a new 
German military sanctioned by the Allies. The veterans of the war petitioned the NATO 
powers, who were reeling from the Korean War, to reform West Germany’s fighting 
force as a safeguard for Europe. NATO agreed and imprisoned veterans were released. 
Now free and welcomed into a rearming society, these veterans would see to it that their 
legacy be secured from defamation with the writing of memoirs and accounts further 
placing the blame onto the Nazis and those who died at Nuremberg. 
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